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ABSTRACT
Despite the importance of living arrangements for well-being and production, the effect of changes
in household income on living arrangements is not well understood. This study overcomes the
identification problems that have limited the study of the link between income and living
arrangements by exploiting a discontinuity in the benefit formula for the social pension in South
Africa. In contrast to the findings of the existing literature from wealthier populations, we find no
evidence that pension income is used to maintain the independence of black elders in South Africa.
Rather, potential beneficiaries alter their household structure. Prime working age women depart, and
we observe an increase in children under 5 and young women of child-bearing age. These shifts in
co-residence patterns are consistent with a setting where prime age women have comparative
advantage in work away from extended family relative to younger women. The additional income
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we study the impact of pension income on living arrangements in the 
context of a low income country.
1  An evaluation of the effect of pension income on living 
arrangements is particularly timely given the rapid aging of the population in low income 
countries.  The aggregate growth rate of elderly in low income countries is more than double that 
of wealthy countries, and as a result, many countries are considering adopting or expanding 
pension programs (Kinsella and Velkoff 2001).  Living arrangements are of interest to 
economists because they are an important component of well-being.  The U.S. literature on 
pensions and living arrangements emphasizes the consumption element of living arrangements 
(Costa 1997 and 1999, Englehardt, Gruber, and Perry 2002).  People care directly about with 
whom they live, and living arrangements affect each person's ability to influence household 
decisions.  In addition, living arrangements can affect the organization of household production 
(Benjamin 1992).  This issue may be particularly relevant in the developing country context, but 
has not received much attention in the existing literature.
2  Finally, the effect of pension income 
on living arrangements is relevant to the broader literature analyzing household responses to 
fluctuations in income such as the literatures on labor supply, consumption insurance, intra-
household allocation, and the permanent income hypothesis.  While many authors note concerns 
about potential biases attributable to endogenous living arrangements, little evidence exists 
documenting how significant these biases may be.
3 
                                                 
1 We use the phrases "living arrangements" and "household composition" interchangeably.  Strauss and Thomas 
(1995) point to a large literature documenting that the concept of the household extends beyond a residential unit.  
We study the impact of pension income on the demographic traits of individuals that occupy the same physical 
residence as the elder. 
2 Living arrangements may also affect how the household copes with risk and how household decisions are made.  
These issues are discussed in section 2. 
3 We are aware of the following studies that consider changes in household composition with income changes in a 
developing country context.  Ainsworth (1996) considers the determinants of child-fostering in Cote d'Ivoire and 
finds that the receiving family's demand for labor is highly correlated with the level of fostering.  Butcher (1993)   2
The paucity of evidence on the link between pensions or income more generally on living 
arrangements is driven by three main empirical challenges.  First, household decisions that 
impact income are made by those living in the household; changing household members may 
change these decisions.  This creates the problem of disentangling the effect of income on living 
arrangements from the effect of living arrangements on income.  Second, income varies over the 
life cycle, and pension income in particular is age dependent.  Living arrangements change over 
the life cycle as well.  Disentangling the impacts of pension income from the impacts of aging is 
challenging.  Third, income (especially pension income) depends on cumulative work histories.  
Thus, income today depends on decisions made earlier, and these decisions may also 
independently influence today's living arrangements. 
In this paper we study the impact of an old-age income support program on the living 
arrangements of elder, black women in South Africa.  This is a good context for considering the 
impact of income on household composition, because the unique benefit structure of the South 
African social pension enables us to address the identification problems that have limited 
research on the effects of income on living arrangements.  For elder black women in South 
Africa, social pension income depends primarily on age-eligibility - women become eligible for 
the pension at age 60.
4  Thus, pension income does not depend on the presence of extended 
families nor cumulative work histories.  We identify the impacts of pension income on elderly 
living arrangements, overcoming the problem that pension income is age dependent, by 
                                                                                                                                                             
uses the same dataset as Ainsworth and finds that changes in child fostering and the number of adults are highly 
correlated with changes in household economic status.  Grimard (2000), also using data from Cote d'Ivoire, finds an 
association between rainfall, income, and household composition, although he posits that changes in household 
composition are driven by labor demand.  Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas (2003) find that Indonesia's financial 
crisis induced a movement of dependents and some types of workers from high cost urban areas to lower cost rural 
areas. 
4 There is a means-test to the social pension, but it is set at such a high level that it does not bind for most black 
households (Alderman 1999).  For this reason we focus on blacks.  For other groups in South Africa, pension 
eligibility is more likely to be an endogenous decision.   3
exploiting the discontinuous nature of the age eligibility rule in the pension benefit formula.  We 
assume that absent the pension, changes in living arrangements associated with the aging of 
black women are smooth.
5  We then look for discontinuous changes in composition that occur at 
the age of pension eligibility, allowing for flexible smooth trends in age. 
Our results differ from the previous literature in several interesting ways.  In particular, 
the existing literature on pensions and living arrangements (which is primarily set within 
developed countries) focuses on how pensions enable the elderly to maintain their independence 
(Costa 1997 and 1999, Carvalho 2000, McGarry and Schoeni 2000, Englehardt, Gruber, and 
Perry 2002).  There is nearly universal empirical support for the hypothesis that income enables 
the elderly to maintain their preferred state of independence.  We examine the effects of pension 
age-eligibility on the household size of the elderly, as well as the probability that they live alone, 
or only with a spouse.  In contrast to much of the previous literature, we find no increase in 
independence associated with pension eligibility. 
However, we do uncover several interesting changes in living arrangements associated 
with pension receipt.  First, we find an increase in the number of children aged 0-5 present when 
an elder woman becomes pension eligible.  Second, we find an increase in the number of women 
aged 18-23 – about the right age to be the children’s mothers.  Third, we find a decrease in the 
number of women aged 30-39.  The magnitudes of these responses are meaningful – with 
changes of approximately 10% of the base age-specific population numbers.  We suspect that 
women 18-23 and women 30-39 are good substitutes in household production, but that women 
30-39 have an advantage in work away from home, perhaps because the child care obligations of 
young mothers make them less productive in the market or less able to live away from home.  
                                                 
5 We focus on women because we believe our smoothness assumption is more tenable for women than men, for 
reasons discussed in Section 3.    4
Moreover, the grandmother may help with the child care of young children, thereby improving 
the ability of young mothers to work in addition to their household production activities. 
In the next section, we review the role living arrangements play in household decisions 
and why they may be affected by pension income.  In section 3, we describe the South African 
pension program in greater detail in the context of our identification strategy.  Section 4 presents 
our findings from the 1996 South African population and housing census and discusses other 
possible interpretations.  Section 5 concludes by summarizing our findings and discussing their 
implications for researchers evaluating the effects of pensions (or income more generally) on 
various household attributes. 
2. Income and Living Arrangements - Theoretical Background 
  We use the term "household" to refer to a set of co-resident individuals and the term 
"family" to refer to the broader kin network, many of whom may not live together.  In this 
section, we consider why a change in the income of an individual family member may influence 
household living arrangements.  We classify possible explanations into three broad categories:  
consumption, contracts, and production. 
2.1 Household composition as consumption 
  Most previous studies of the effects of income on living arrangements view these 
arrangements as something that individuals have preferences over, and argue that additional 
income increases consumption of more preferred living arrangements.  Individuals may prefer 
children or certain family members more than others, but most authors emphasize independence 
as the preferred living state (Michael, Fuchs, and Scott (1980), Costa (1997), Costa (1999), 
Carvalho (2000), McGarry and Schoeni (2000), and Englehardt, Gruber, and Perry (2002)).  
When living arrangements are viewed as consumption, differences in household composition   5
associated with variation in income are interpreted as revealing preferences over living 
arrangements. 
  In collective decision making models (Bourguignon and Chiappori 1992), additional 
income in the hands of an individual may increase their influence on the allocation of family 
resources (Lundberg and Pollak 1993).  In this way, additional income to an elder may then 
increase her influence in her family's affairs.  This rising power may affect the desirability of 
some living arrangements.  Alternatively, she may use her power to change her living 
arrangements by choosing preferred household members or living environments.  Thus, as within 
a unitary household model, changes in household composition associated with variation in 
income can be viewed as indicative of the elder's preferences over living arrangements. 
2.2 Household composition and intra-familial (informal) contracts 
  Increased income may change the informal contracts that families engage in, and can 
subsequently affect household composition.  For instance, if family members insure each other's 
consumption against uncertain dates of death (Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981)), or uncertain income 
shocks (Rosenzweig (1988)), then an increase in income may induce a change in these contracts.  
Moreover, geographic diversification may be an important part of intra-familial insurance 
strategies (Rosenzweig and Stark (1989).  Thus, an increase in income may alter the types of 
diversification strategies that are optimal.  For example, Butcher (1993) emphasizes that child 
fostering may be a mechanism through which families smooth fluctuations in resources. 
  In addition, household composition may be a direct factor in the enforcement of intra-
familial contracts.  Suppose, for instance, that the elderly wish to transfer resources to their 
grandchildren, but are unable to monitor their adult children's compliance with these wishes.  In 
this case, they may choose to have the grandchildren come live with them.  Alternatively, if the   6
family's contract calls for the elderly to share their pension income with their families, but this 
sharing cannot be enforced when the family members live apart, we may see an increase in co-
habitation.  The change in household composition in this case (as with the case of the children 
mentioned above) does not arise from preferences over living arrangements per se.  Instead, it 
arises because household composition is an important input to enforcing intra-familial contracts. 
2.3 Household composition and production 
On the production side, additional income may enable the elderly to purchase market 
substitutes for goods or services otherwise provided by household members (Hoerger, Picone, 
and Sloan 1996 examine substitution between market care and family care of the elderly in the 
US context).  Alternatively, additional income may overcome credit constraints which prevent 
the family from making efficient changes to how it arranges production.  The pension income 
may enable an elderly household to take in grown children or grandchildren to provide non-
tradable goods or services that improve the well being of their family.
6  Similarly, movements to 
exploit earnings opportunities and to minimize living costs have been shown by Frankenberg, 
Smith, and Thomas (2003) to be important coping mechanisms for the shock of the Indonesian 
financial crisis. 
  To summarize, the theoretical literature offers a wide variety of ways in which additional 
income may impact the living arrangements of the elderly, and there are not clear predictions in 
the theory about which mechanisms should dominate.  Given the range of possible impacts, the 
effect of additional resources on household composition is ultimately an empirical question. 
                                                 
6 In data from the Cote d'Ivoire, Ainsworth (1996) finds that the receiving family’s demand for child labor is an 
important determinant of the child fostering decision (even more so than the level of the sending family's resources), 
and Grimard (2000) finds that labor demand is a driving force for changes in labor demand among adults as well.     7
3. Identification 
Empirical examination of the effects of old age support on the living arrangements of the 
elderly poses several challenges, because support generally depends on a recipient's cumulative 
labor history, household composition, and life-cycle attributes.  Several unique attributes of 
South Africa's Old Age Pension Program in South Africa's black population make it well suited 
for considering the effect of old age support on elderly living arrangements. 
The uniqueness of the South African program stems from its origin.  At the end of 
apartheid the white social pension was extended to the black population.  Blacks are substantially 
poorer than whites in South Africa, and so the maximum pension benefit for a black South 
African is approximately twice the median per capita monthly household income of blacks (Case 
and Deaton 1998).  There is a means test to the pension, but it is set as such a high level that it 
does not exclude most black South Africans (Alderman 1999).  Moreover, the means test does 
not take in to account the income of family members, so there is no incentive to rearrange 
households in order to be eligible for the pension (as many have argued exists for social transfer 
systems such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children in the United States, e.g. Bishop 
1980).  Thus, the determining factor for pension eligibility is age rather than labor histories or 
household composition.  Women become eligible for the pension at age 60.
7 
Our empirical approach is driven by this age-discontinuity in the benefit structure of the 
social pension.  Our approach is to compare living arrangements just before pension eligibility to 
living arrangements immediately after; thus, pension eligible individuals are older than their non-
eligible counterparts.  If there is any trend in household composition with respect to age, simple 
eligible/ineligible comparisons will confound the impact of the pension with the impact of age.  
To allow for age trends, we follow Porter (2000) and (in a nonparametric fashion) model the 
                                                 
7 See Case and Deaton 1998 and van der  Berg 2001 Chapter 4 for further details.   8
smooth age trend in living arrangements.  Our estimate of the effect of pension eligibility on 
living arrangements comes from measuring any discontinuous changes in living arrangements at 
the age of pension eligibility.   
Specifically, the living arrangements variable, y, for a woman of age a depends on 
resources and characteristics of the household and all of its potential members.  We assume the 
effects of these (unobserved) resources and characteristics on living arrangements are smooth 
with respect to an individual's age.  We write the expectation of the outcome variable y 
conditional on age as:  
(1)  () ym a d α ε =+ +  
where d is an indicator that is 1 if a person is pension eligible,  0 EA ε = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ (where a=A is the age 
of pension eligibility), and  ( ) m  is continuous at the age of pension eligibility.
8  Porter suggests 
rewriting (1) as: 
(2)  ( ) ( ) yd m A α ε −= + . 
We have a new dependent variable:( ) yd α − .  α  is estimated by finding a value of α  that 
minimizes the averaged squared deviation between this new dependent variable and the 
nonparametric estimate of  () mA.  Thus, we use data from both above and below the 
discontinuity in pension eligibility at age 60 in a kernel regression, with more weight given to 
                                                 
8 In the data, observed age is discrete.  In a set of Monte Carlo experiments where the generated data has moments 
that match those in the observed data, we have compared results when age is observed continuously to results when 
age is rounded down to the nearest integer.  We find that both the continuous results and the results where age is 
rounded down to an integer have similar distributions of estimated treatment impacts and t-statistics with 
approximately normal distributions.   9
data points closest to age 60, to estimate the change in the conditional expectation of the living 
arrangements variable at the age when an individual becomes pension eligible.
9   
Two assumptions are critical for the consistency of this regression discontinuity estimator 
and deserve special emphasis.  The first is that the probability of treatment (pension eligibility) 
varies discontinuously at the age cut-off point.  This assumption follows directly from the 
pension benefit formula, and we will show that the data are consistent with this assumption.  The 
second assumption is that if there were no treatment (i.e., no pension program), the outcome of 
interest would be continuous at the age cut-off.  That is, while we expect that a given household 
characteristic (number of small children in the household, for example) may vary with the age of 
the oldest woman, there is no a priori reason to think that at age 60 (and not at 59 or 61) 
household characteristics should change dramatically.  Retirement that would occur even in the 
absence of the pension program is one possible concern.  However, the data do not suggest that 
retirement is a substantive issue for women (this issue is discussed in Appendix A). 
One important qualification to this discontinuity approach is that we are limited in the 
types of household changes it can detect.  For example, we cannot identify effects that occur if 
households respond to the pension either before or after actual eligibility.  If pension receipt 
tends to cause relatives to move in with an elder woman, they may do so when she turns 59, in 
anticipation of her becoming eligible.  Alternatively, it may take several years for household 
                                                 
9 In our kernel estimation, we use an Epanechnikov kernel (specifically: ( )( )
2 () . 7 5 1 . 2 5  f o r   5 Kz z z =− < ), 
and a bandwidth of 2.  Standard errors are calculated following the discussion in Porter (2000).  For reference of 
future researchers interested in using the Porter regression-discontinuity methodology, the constant ck in Theorem 1 
(Porter 2000, pg. 12) is 6.3582 for the indicated form of the Epanechnikov kernel. 
  Our choice of bandwidth is driven by a desire to balance identifying locally against the need for smoothing 
to account for age trends and to prevent us from identifying off of idiosyncratic bumps in the data.  We have 
compared the findings presented below to what we would find with alternate bandwidths of 1.5 and 3.  We reach 
qualitatively the same conclusions with either alternative bandwidth.  The main exception to this is that with the 
bandwidth equal to 3, the coefficient on children 0-5 is not significantly different from zero.  We cannot reject 
statistically that our results for bandwidths 1.5 or 3 are the same as the point estimates using a bandwidth of 2 in 
every result highlighted below with the exception of the income results where a bandwidth of 3 returns a 17 
percentage point decline in the probability that a woman reports no income with pension eligibility.   10
members to adjust their composition in response to pension eligibility.  Both of these timing 
issues attenuate any measured program impact.  We note, however, that Lund (1993) finds no 
descriptive evidence of individuals being able to borrow in advance of pension eligibility even 
though pensioners have better access to credit once they have attained eligibility.  Hence 
liquidity constraints may restrict the ability of individuals to act in anticipation of the pension. 
A second issue is that we focus on age-eligibility rather than actual pension receipt.  We 
do so because pension take-up is an endogenous household choice whereas an individual’s age is 
not.  Our estimates are an attenuated measure of the true impact if take-up of the pension is 
incomplete (as it certainly is) or does not coincide exactly with eligibility.  Moreover, there is apt 
to be measurement error in reported ages.  If this measurement error is classical, it will further 
attenuate our findings based on age-eligibility.  In practice, there appears to be a moderate degree 
of rounding in reported ages in the data to either ages in round decades or to ages that correspond 
to birth years reported in round decades.
10  This creates a problem for identification, because the 
pension eligibility of women begins at age 60.  In the presentations of the raw data below, it will 
be obvious that women at age 60 generally look different than would be predicted by the trend 
prior to age 60 and the trend after age 60 (see especially Figures 1,2,4, and 5).  Thus, we exclude 
women at age 60 from estimation.
11  This alters the population to which our results are 
                                                 
10 In a set of Monte Carlo simulations, we have generated data with a continuous age distribution and with heaped 
ages that correspond to what we observe in the data used in this study.  Using the regression discontinuity design 
described in this section, we found that estimated treatment effects were more disperse with heaped data.  However, 
the distributions of the T-statistics were approximately standard normal in both generated datasets.  Thus, statistical 
inference is not adversely impacted by age heaping per se. 
11 In the simulations described in the previous footnote, we observed that when we excluded observations at age 60 
from the heaped data, the standard deviation of the distribution of T-statistics increased by roughly 30-50 percent.  
As a check on our results, we have used a bootstrapping procedure to generate empirical standard errors for each of 
our models.  In simulations, bootstrapped standard errors generated T-statistics that were approximately standard 
normal.  In our data, bootstrapping increases estimated standard errors by approximately 45 percent.  The statistical 
significance of our results is generally unaffected by using bootstrapped standard errors.  The only exception to this 
in the main results (presented in the next section) is that the findings for children 0-5 are only significant at 10 
percent (T=1.92).   11
applicable.  That is, our estimated impacts are most relevant for the population that is less likely 
to misreport its age. 
4. Data and Main Findings 
4.1 Data 
While the identification assumptions in our empirical work are weak, the methodology 
requires a large dataset for our analysis to have statistical power.  As a result, we focus on the 
living arrangements of black elder women in black headed households in the 10 percent public 
use sample of the 1996 Population and Housing Census of South Africa.
12  Households are 
defined in the census as a group of people (or one person) who live together at least 4 days a 
week and jointly provide themselves with food and other necessities.  Live-in employees were 
regarded as separate households (Statistics South Africa. n.d. (c)).
13  Our analysis is then based 
on the 299,885 (unweighted) black women 40 and older living in households with black heads.
14 
We focus exclusively on women in this paper, because we are concerned that our 
identification assumptions are more suspect for men.  First, we are more comfortable with our 
assumption that the underlying age trends in our measures of household composition are smooth 
absent the pension for women.  Men are more likely to face retirement incentives (absent the 
pension) at the age of pension eligibility in the formal sector of the South African economy.  As 
                                                 
12 Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) administered the 1996 census to cover the night of October 9
th to 10
th .  
Respondents either filled in the questionnaires themselves or were interviewed by enumerators.  Questionnaires 
were translated into all 11 official languages of South Africa.  Data were adjusted for undercount (with both 
household and person weights) on the basis of a nationwide post-enumeration survey.  (Statistics South Africa. n.d. 
(a))  The data we use come from a 10 percent public use sample representing 40,578,900 individuals and 9,058,540 
households.  Individuals not living in households but in hostels or institutions such as prisons and hospitals were 
counted in the census but are excluded from our analysis (Statistics South Africa. n.d. (b)). 
13 We designate black households by the race of the household head.  In a small percentage of cases where no head 
of household was indicated, we designated a black household by the race of the next most closely related family 
member (usually the spouse).  The census allowed more than one household head to be reported; for the 0.4 percent 
of households with multiple heads we chose the oldest head for determining the race of the household (in the 
instance of a tie for oldest, we chose the oldest male) 
14 3 percent of the sample is dropped because age information is missing for one or more household members.  We 
dropped 62 individuals in households with at least one member indicating institutional residence (this being 
inconsistent with our sample definition).   12
discussed in appendix A, the data do not suggest that formal retirement is a significant issue for 
women.  Second, Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller (2003) report that in some provinces men 
report pension take up upon turning 60, rather than 65.  Thus, our assumption that treatment is 
discontinuous at the age of pension eligibility may not be fully accurate in the male population.  
Moreover, in addition to these identification concerns, much of the previous literature on the 
South African pension program (Duflo 2003, Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller 2003, for 
example) has concluded that female pensioners are more likely to share their pension income 
with household members.  Thus, we are more likely to find program effects in the female 
population. 
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for the living arrangements of women 
within 10 years of pension eligibility.  Column 1 contains summary statistics for women that are 
not yet pension eligible, and column 2 refers to eligible women.  Individuals who are pension 
eligible live in slightly larger households.  There are more young children ages 0 to 5 in 
households with a pension eligible individual.  There are fewer individuals aged 18-23 living 
with the older women.  In addition, we observe more persons of prime work age (30-39) in 
pension eligible households.   
This naive comparison of households with and without a pension eligible person does not 
reflect the causal impact of the pension program, because age trends are confounded with the 
pension program.  The differences in household structure found in table 1 may be due entirely to 
age and have nothing to do with the pension per se.  This problem of separating age differences 
from the effect of the pension benefit is the reason for using the regression discontinuity 
estimator applied in the next section.   13
4.2 Pension Eligibility Affects Income 
Our focus is on how living arrangements change discontinuously at the age of pension 
eligibility.  Although we do not attempt to directly measure an income elasticity of living 
arrangements, we interpret the changes in living arrangements associated with pension eligibility 
as an effect of pension income.  Figure 1 presents some support for the idea that pension 
eligibility substantially impacts income.  Figure 1 also illustrates how our empirical approach 
works in practice. 
The Census asks for each household member’s income, with possible responses grouped 
into 14 categories.  In panel A of figure 1, we plot the probability that a woman reports receiving 
zero income against her age.  The circles in panel A are (unsmoothed) nationally representative 
means from the census, and 95 percent confidence bounds for these means are also graphed.  The 
curve is the result of using our semi-parametric regression discontinuity estimator.  We regress 
an indicator that is 1 if a woman reports no earnings in the last year against age, allowing a 
change (as described above) at age 60 when a woman becomes pension eligible. Panel A shows 
that about 58 percent of women in their early 50’s report zero income during the previous year.  
This proportion declines slightly among women in their late 50’s, and drops dramatically - 12.5 
percentage points – as women become age-eligible for the pension.  The T-statistic for the null 
hypothesis that the jump at age 60 is zero is over 15.
 15  In panel B we consider the probability 
that a pension-eligible black woman reports a personal income that is equal to or greater than the 
amount of the pension.  This probability increases by 12 percentage points at age 60, a 
statistically significant increase.  Thus, we treat the effects of age eligibility as income effects 
throughout this study. 
                                                 
15 This estimate (as well as most estimates that follow in the paper) is based on 53,834 individuals receiving non-
zero weight.  For readers who wish to compute hypothesis testing using a Schwarz (or Bayesian Information)-type 
Criterion, we calculate that sqrt(log(53,834))=3.3 could be used as an alternate critical value to the usual 1.96.   14
4.3 Pensions do not alter the trend away from independence 
We have noted that most of the existing literature on elderly living arrangements in high 
income countries finds that additional income enables the elderly to continue their 
independence.
16  We begin examining whether pension eligibility affects elderly independence in 
South Africa by considering whether there are changes in household size around the elderly with 
pension eligibility.  In Figure 2 we plot household size against a woman’s age; as before, the 
circles represent the weighted, unsmoothed census means, and 95 percent confidence bounds for 
these means are pictured.  The regression curve shows a general trend towards increasing 
household size as women approach the age pension eligibility.  This upward trend in household 
size with age may reflect that older individuals are less able to rely on their own earnings and 
physical output or that older individuals will have older children who are thereby more likely to 
have children or even grandchildren of their own.  Our discontinuity approach captures any 
discrete changes associated with pension eligibility in this trend towards increasing household 
size. 
The point estimates of the size of the discontinuity are reproduced in table 2, row 1.  We 
find an increase of approximately 0.09 household members associated with pension eligibility.  
This corresponds to an approximate 1 percent increase in household size.
17  This small increase 
in household size is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
We also examine directly the effects of pension eligibility on the probability that an elder 
woman lives independently – either alone or only with a spouse.  In Figure 3 the dependent 
                                                 
16 For examples, see Michael, Fuchs, and Scott (1980), Borsch-Supan, McFadden, and Schnabel (1993), Costa 
(1997), Costa (1999), and Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2002).  For middle income countries, DaVanzo and Chan 
(1994) and Carvalho (2000) find similar results for Malaysia and Brazil. 
17 In order to calculate percentage changes, we need to know what the mean household size (or any other dependent 
variable) would be at the age of pension eligibility in the absence of the pension program.  To calculate this, we use 
the age trend before pension age to project the expected household size at the pension age.  These projected means 
are the means reported in tables 2 and 3 and referenced henceforth in the text.   15
variable is an indicator that is one if woman lives alone or only with a spouse.  We see that living 
independently is rare among elder South Africans- only 8 percent of women age 59 do so.  In 
addition, there is a general trend away from living independently as a black woman ages.  Figure 
3 shows there is no statistically significant break in this trend associated with pension eligibility.  
Estimates of α, the pension eligibility associated change in the probability an individual lives 
alone or with only a spouse, are in table 2, rows 2 and 3.  These coefficients are small and 
statistically insignificant.  Thus, the data fail to reject the hypothesis of no impact of pension 
eligibility on elderly independence.  This finding contrasts with almost all of the research on 
pension effects on living arrangements from populations richer than black South Africa.   
There are a number of possible explanations for why the results on elderly independence 
are different in South Africa.  First, the preferences of the elderly over independence could be 
different in South Africa.   However, we do not have strong priors that elderly South Africans 
care more about their extended family or have more desire to live with kin than do elders 
elsewhere.  Second, there may be little scope for pension income to affect independence (even if 
the elderly would prefer it) given that an independent arrangement is rare.  A third possibility is 
that the pension in South Africa could be so large that (due to the absence of complete contracts) 
adult children merge households with the elderly to monitor the sharing of the funds, inducing a 
decline in elderly independence.  However, our results do not suggest a decline in independence 
with the pension.  Rather, the general age trend away from independence continues unabated 
with the pension eligibility.  
Another explanation for the lack of increased independence is that there may be missing 
markets in South Africa for goods and services that would enable the elderly to compensate for 
the diminishing capacity for home production that accompanies age.  Alternatively, these goods   16
and services may be available, but substantially more expensive than using within household 
labor to provide them.  In this case, pension income may be used by elders to alter household 
composition in order to either bring in additional labor to provide these goods and services.  
Finally, liquidity constraints could also be relevant.  With liquidity constraints, an increase in 
income could lead a decline in the cost of home production by a reorganization of production 
(either through purchased inputs or changes in the labor mix).  Thus, to the extent that household 
production is more significant in low income countries because of missing markets or because of 
labor market imperfections, the effect of income on shadow prices may be more important.  In 
this way, incomplete or underdeveloped markets for goods and services consumed by the elderly 
might be an important reason why we do not observe income effects on independence for black 
South Africans. 
4.4 Pensions are associated with increases in the number of young children and women of 
age to be their mothers as well as a decline in the presence of prime working age women 
Though we observe no break in the trend away from independent living and no 
statistically significant changes in household size, the discussion of why household composition 
may change with income suggests scope for important changes in living arrangements when 
women become pension eligible.  We examine changes in living arrangements by looking at 
changes in the presence of females and males for various age groupings in Appendix B.  This 
section highlights the most important of these results.  Figures 4-6 contain the census means and 
kernel regression results by the age of the elder woman for the number of children ages 0 to 5 
(figure 4), the number of women ages 18 – 23 (figure 5), and the number of women ages 30 –39 
(figure 6).  These graphs show the basic elements of how the households of pension-eligible 
women are re-shaped.  The regression discontinuity estimates of the impacts are reproduced in   17
Table 3.  One obvious question is whether the findings in figures 4-6 represent the movement of 
the elderly or the movement of others.  The discussion in Appendix C suggests that all of our 
main findings are present in the sub-sample of elders who live in rural areas and have not moved 
in the last 7 years.
18   
We find a large and statistically significant increase of 0.05 in children 0-5 with pension 
eligibility.  This corresponds to a 7 percent increase in the number of young children in a 
household on average.  This increase in the number of young children does not appear to be an 
effect of the pension on fertility that is timed with pension eligibility.  We examine whether the 
pension is associated with an increase in births in the household.  In Table 3, row 4, we do not 
find any statistically significant relationship between births in the year prior to pension eligibility 
and female pension receipt.  The estimated change in fertility with the pension eligibility of 
women is actually slightly negative.  Of course, our method does not capture the effect of 
anticipated pension income on fertility.  Hence, the results in figure 4 reflect either children 
being brought into the household or fertility in anticipation of the pension by more than a year. 
We observe an increase in the presence of young women ages 18-23 of .04 young women 
per elder.  This corresponds to more than a 10 percent increase in the presence of young women.  
The rise in young children and 18-23 year old women may be related, because it is not unusual 
for a black woman in the 18-23 year old group to have a child, and that child is likely to be aged 
5 or younger.
19 
                                                 
18 The point estimates are very similar for most variables when we condition on rural non-movers.  However, 
statistical significance for impacts on children 0-5 and women 18-23 are not robust to using the bootstrapped 
standard errors discussed in footnote 11. 
19 Age-specific fertility rates for black South African women ages 20-24 are estimated to be from 0.104 to 0.159 
(Moultrie and Timaeus, 2002).  The relationship identifiers in our data do not permit the matching of individual 
children to their mothers.  Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas (2003) also find evidence of the co-movement of young 
children and women who are probably their mothers during Indonesia's financial crisis. 
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At first glance, a comparison of figures 4 and 5 might seem inconsistent with a 
relationship between the increased cohabitation of women 18-23 and children 0-5.  Rather, they 
illustrate the usefulness of our regression discontinuity approach.  If a researcher were to look 
only at the age trends in these variables (figures 4 and 5), she would note that the number of 
children increases with the elder’s age, and the number of young women decreases with the 
elder’s age.  By focusing on the age trends alone, she might conclude that these two variables 
move in opposite directions.  This conclusion is reinforced by comparing the means in Table 1.  
However, our discontinuity estimator uncovers a different pattern that we think is more likely to 
be related to exogenous changes in income.  With pension eligibility, there is a large increase in 
women 18-23 even though there is a decreasing trend in number of young women in the 
household.  With this discontinuous increase in young women at the start of their child-bearing 
years, we also observe a large change in the number of children 0-5 in the household. 
The data also reveal a decline in women age 30-39 that is of a similar magnitude to the 
increase in young women.  That is, 0.04 women 30-39 depart and 0.04 women 18-23 arrive with 
pension eligibility.  As with young women, the change in the presence of 30-39 associated with 
pension eligibility is opposite in direction to the overall age trend in the presence of women 30-
39.  As such, it is an effect of pension eligibility that would be missed without focusing on the 
discontinuity in the pension eligibility rules. 
Why do we observe an increase in the number of children and young women with 
pension eligibility?  An obvious potential reason is the direct consumption of child 
companionship by the elderly.  Elders may consume more child companionship with an increase 
in income if child companionship is a normal good or they may prefer to live with small children 
and the additional income strengthens their influence on consumption choices.  A number of   19
studies have found that increases in income are associated with increased decision-making power 
of the income recipient (e.g. Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997, Thomas and Rubalcava 2001).  
Additionally, the increase in children and young women may be due to a change in how the 
family organizes its production.  Children may accompany parents moving back to the household 
of the pensioner; or they may arrive unaccompanied, because the pensioner is taking care of 
them while the parents work.  In this latter case, the rise in women at the start of their child-
bearing years would be purely coincident. 
It is interesting to note that the entrance of young women is similar in magnitude to the 
decline in the presence of prime working age women.  Is there an explanation for this pattern that 
does not depend on preferences or changes in intrahousehold influence?  These results are not 
necessarily consistent with the idea that "predators" are moving in to co-opt the income of elders 
or that living arrangements are changing to monitor elderly management of the cash, if prime age 
workers (rather than young mothers) are most effective at this sort of behavior.  Rather, we 
speculate that young mothers and older women are similarly productive in home production but 
that young women have a lower relative value of market time than prime age women.  This may 
be because they have accumulated less work experience and because there are complementarities 
in raising young children and working at home.
20  Thus, the elder uses the pension income to 
shift towards the relatively low cost input into household production.  This appears in the data as 
an outflow prime age working women and an inflow of young mothers.  The comparative 
advantage of prime age women in work away from home may stem from the fact that they have 
older children that do not require continual supervision.  Hence, the help of a grandmother is not 
                                                 
20 Differences in the relative value of time between older women and younger mothers may also interplay with 
household risk management strategies.  For example, when the pension provides a stable source of income at home, 
the prime age woman may be able to move to an employment opportunity where transfers back home are difficult to 
do quickly in response to a crisis, because she knows that the household will be able to use the pension income to 
cope with the short-term consequences of a shock.   20
required to increase the mother’s productivity.  It is plausible that for younger women whose 
children need more care, the grandmother serves a caretaking role that helps improve the family's 
return on young mothers.  We find this explanation plausible, although it cannot be distinguished 
from an explanation based on preferences. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we document the changes in living arrangements that result from pension 
eligibility for elderly black South African women.  We do so using a regression discontinuity 
estimator that relies on weak assumptions to obtain the causal impacts of pension income on 
composition.  In particular, we assume that the underlying age-composition relationship is 
smooth in age and that the probability of receiving the pension changes discontinuously at the 
age of pension eligibility.  In this way, our study illustrates how administrative program rules can 
be a useful source of identification to circumvent the endogeneity problems that have limited the 
study of the relationship between income and household composition. 
In contrast to much of the literature on wealthy countries, we find no evidence that the 
additional pension income leads to an increased propensity to live alone.  Both the probability of 
independent living and the average size of the household do not change with pension eligibility.  
Our findings offer a counterexample to the notion that “[as the financial] status of elderly people 
improves, a larger proportion are able to afford to live alone and choose to do so in independent 
dwellings…” (Kinsella and Velkoff 2001, p. 68).  Instead, our findings emphasize the role that 
the elderly play in supporting their extended families as well as the support the elderly in turn 
depend upon.  One important reason for why this interdependence dominates the desire to live 
independently may be the less developed markets for many of the goods and services consumed 
by households in the South African context.   21
Instead of using pension income to maintain their independence, elder women use their 
income to alter living arrangements.  These adjustments take several forms.  First, when a 
woman becomes pension eligible, we observe a decline in the number of co-resident women in 
their 30s, who may have a comparative advantage in work away (labor force participation rates 
peak for women in the census around age 40, and are high for women 30-50 years old). Second, 
we find increases in the presence of young children (0 to 5) and of women whose age group 
suggests that they could be these children’s mothers (18 to 23).  This is consistent with the 
caretaking role of grandmothers emphasized in some of the descriptive literature.  Alternatively, 
missing markets and labor market imperfections in the developing country context may be 
responsible for this distinct result although we cannot rule our explanations that depend on 
preferences or changes in family decision-making.  Young mothers may have comparative 
advantage (relative to older women) in working within the household and in the presence of 
elders both because of their significantly shorter work experience and because of the burdens and 
costs of rearing young children.  The pension income then enables the household to allocate 
labor more optimally by moving young women in and prime-age women out. 
The changes in living arrangements that we observe have several implications.  First, 
there is a large literature documenting that grandparents help their grandchildren and hence that 
social policy directed at the elderly benefits other generations (e.g. Case 2003, Case and Deaton 
1998, Duflo 2003, Edmonds 2003, Jensen 2004, Lund 1993).  This paper highlights another 
mechanism by which elders may assist other generations: enabling individuals to move out of the 
household and others to move in.   
Second, policy makers need to use caution in designing income transfer programs given 
the substantive changes in living arrangements observed with pension eligibility.  In addition to   22
the usual distortions imposed by government transfer programs, a policy that is conditioned on 
household composition may introduce additional distortions, by interfering with households' 
optimal responses to income changes.  For example, targeting cash transfers to children but 
varying transfers with household size or limiting transfers to households with single parents may 
prevent individuals from adjusting their living arrangements in response to income fluctuations.  
  Third, the systematic changes in living arrangements in response to income changes 
highlight the fact that household members move in and out as a response to changes in income.  
This ability to shift living arrangements has implications for the consumption, insurance, growth, 
intrahousehold, and labor supply literatures that require further investigation. 
We conclude with three examples of how our results might have implications for other 
studies evaluating the effects of a pension program or changes in household income.  For 
example, there is a literature on whether targeting or labeling income affects how it is spent 
(Thaler 1990, Kooreman 2000, Edmonds 2002).  In the context of the South African pension, 
Case and Deaton (1998) consider whether the marginal propensity to spend pension income is 
different than for other sources of income (they do not find it to be different).  As they point out, 
the effects of the pension on living arrangements could temper their conclusions.  Changes in 
household composition will change expenditure patterns directly.  Therefore a different marginal 
propensity to spend out of pension income could reflect either the treatment of pension income 
or underlying changes in household composition if the marginal propensity to consume does not 
vary across types of income. 
A second example applies to the literature that considers the effects of income increases 
on individual well-being.  For example, Duflo (2000, 2003) finds that the Old Age Pension 
improves the nutritional status of co-resident children.  Our study documents an inflow of   23
children due to the pension.  As Duflo (2003) notes, if this inflow is comprised of particularly 
health (or less healthy) children, then estimates of the impact of the pension on the health may be 
biased.  For example, an altruistic grandmother might bring in relatively disadvantaged children 
to care for when she begins to receive the pension.  This selection of disadvantaged 
grandchildren could cause estimates of the pension's impact on child nutrition to understate its 
true impact.  Interestingly, Duflo (2000, 2003) finds an impact of the pension on the health of 
girls, but not boys.  We find that the pension results in an inflow of boys more than girls.  One 
possibility is that Duflo's "zero result" for boys may reflect a positive impact on health, 
combined with a negative selection effect in terms of household composition. 
A third example relates to research that considers the impacts of government transfer 
programs on labor supply.  In the South African context, Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller 
(2003) find declines in the labor supply of adult males associated with the pension receipt of 
elder women, but they do not observe declines in the labor supply of prime-age women.  Our 
finding of substantive decreases in the number of prime-age women with female pension 
eligibility might imply that the absence of measured labor supply effects for women may be 
driven by an outflow of prime-age women, who would otherwise stop working in the presence of 
the pension.  Naturally, as with the other examples, one could imagine other selection stories that 
generate different types of bias.  However, in general it is critical to consider changes in 
household composition when evaluating response to changes in household income. 
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Appendix A: Formal Retirement and the Pension Eligibility of Women 
Perhaps the most important identifying assumption of our methodology is the following: 
in the absence of the pension, family composition would change only smoothly (with respect to 
age) at age 60 for women.  This assumption would be violated, for example, if other institutional 
features in the South African economy induced changes in family composition at these ages.  
One such institution would be incentives in the formal work sector that induce retirement at age 
60 for women.  If these institutions are prevalent, we will confound the impacts of the pension 
with the impacts of these other institutions. 
We are unable to look directly at retirement patterns at the eligibility ages because the 
pension itself is likely to induce retirement.  For example, the pension income may enable an 
elder female to stop working.  This in turn may change her preferences for family composition.  
This type of retirement effect is not an identification problem for this paper – indeed, this is part   27
of what we hope to capture.  Instead, we are concerned about the possibility that, in the absence 
of the pension, retirement would largely occur at pension ages. 
We cannot test directly for this in our data because of the above-mentioned direct effects 
of the pension on elderly retirement.  However, several points suggest that in practice the 
problem is minor for women pensioners.  First, most black South Africans are not engaged in 
formal employment that would have a fixed retirement age.  This is especially true for women, 
most of whom report no income prior to receiving the pension (Panel A of figure 1).  Second, 
most black South Africans are sufficiently poor that they do not have the luxury of terminating 
employment at a specified age (in the absence of the pension).  This has been found consistently 
in other low income countries (e.g. Cameron and Cobb-Clark 2001, Benjamin, Brandt, and Fan 
2003).  Typically, poor health and other problems associated with aging force the elderly out of 
employment, but there is no reason why we should expect health shocks for women at 60 versus 
59 or 61. 
In order to examine the extent of formal retirement issues, we compare the retirement 
patterns of elder women who are likely affected by formal retirement to those that are not.  First, 
we classify workers into two groups:  those we think are very unlikely to have formal retirement 
incentives (workers in agriculture, fisheries, or what the South African Census classifies as 
"elementary occupations
21.")  We then compare these workers' retirement patterns around the 
ages of pension eligibility against those in the other industries which are more likely to be 
formal.  We hypothesize that formal retirement should only affect individuals engaged in formal 
work, while both formal and informal workers should experience the retirement induced by the 
pension program.  Thus, we use the change in work that we observe in the informal sector as a 
baseline to compare to the change in work that we observe in the formal sector where formal 
retirement is more likely.  If the pension affects formal and informal workers similarly, then any 
extra change that we observe in the formal sector could be attributed to formal retirement. 
  In the our sample, 12.6 percent of black women aged 59 are working in what we have 
defined as informal work and are hence unlikely to face formal retirement (only 19 percent of 
black women are working at age 59, so 66 percent of these participate in informal work).  The 
fraction of women in informal work declines to 6.7 percent of the population by age 61.  This 
represents a relative decrease of 47 percent.  For women who are working in occupations 
potentially subject to formal retirement, we observe a drop from 6.5 percent of the population 
aged 59 to 3.9 percent of the population aged 61, a relative decrease of 40 percent.  Thus, formal 
retirement is not likely to be a serious complication in our results when women become pension 
eligible, because we observe similar declines in employment in both formal and informal groups.  
Our calculations for men at pension eligibility were less encouraging, and thus we restrict our 
attention in this paper to the pension eligibility of women. 
Appendix B:  Regression Discontinuity Results for all Age-Sex Groups 
                                                 
21 Three subcategories of elementary occupations are listed in the Census documentation:  Sales and services 
elementary occupations; Agricultural, fishery and related labourers; and Labourers in mining, construction, 
manufacturing, and transport.  However, we reclassify anyone in this category who also reports their industry as 
mining as engaged in possibly formal work.   28
We examine changes in household composition by looking at changes in the presence of 
females and males in age groupings 0 to 5, 6 to 11, 12 to 17, 18 to 23, 24 to 29, 30 to 39 and 40 
to 49.  To present this information succinctly, we change our presentation slightly.  We create a 
set of gender - age group counts and run a series of regressions (still using Porter’s methodology) 
to estimate the change in that gender - age group count associated with female pension 
eligibility.  For example, we estimate the impact of women’s pension eligibility on the number of 
girls 0-5 in the household.  Then, we estimate the impact of eligibility on the number of girls 6-
11 and so on through age group 40-49.  We repeat this process to estimate the impact of pension 
eligibility for the same age groups for males. 
The by age group changes in the number of females associated with the pension 
eligibility of a woman are in figure 7.  The points labeled M  indicate the estimated change in the 
number of men for each group, and the points labeled F indicate the estimated changes in 
women.    Each point in the figure represents an estimate of α in (2) from one regression.  Thus, 
the point (X,Y) has the interpretation of “the number of X-year old females in the household 
increases by Y as a woman becomes pension eligible.”  95 percent confidence intervals for the 
estimated change in the number of co-resident persons in each group are also pictured in figure 
7. 
To aid interpretation, we present these results in slightly different form in Figure 8.  Since 
the distribution of ages in the population is not perfectly uniform, the results would be easier to 
interpret if expressed as percentage changes.  Hence, in figure 8, we present confidence intervals 
and point estimates for the semi-elasticities calculated by dividing the discontinuity estimate by 
the mean number of individuals in a given gender - age group that are co-resident with elderly 





Thus, the semi-elasticities in figure 8 are based on the estimates of α  pictured in figure 7 and the 
corresponding estimates of  ˆ() m AgeofPensionEligiblilty . 
  There are two main changes when women become pension eligible.  First, the number of 
0-5 year olds (the magnitude of the effect and the statistical significance is greater for boys than 
girls) and 18-23 year olds (both sexes) increase.
22  As noted in the text, the rise in 18-23 year old 
women and 0-5 year olds is likely to be related.  It is possible that the increase in young men is 
also related to the increase in young women, in that they may be partners.  Second, the number 
of women 30-39 and of men 40-49 decrease. 
Appendix C:  Regression Discontinuity Results for Non-movers 
Our primary results identify the impact of pension eligibility on the household 
composition of elder women.  However, we are unable to determine directly if these changes are 
due to family members moving in with (or away from) the elderly, or if the elderly themselves 
                                                 
22 The statistical significance of the results for men 18-23 is not robust to using the bootstrapped standard errors 
discussed in footnote 11.   29
are changing location.  One way we can shed light on this issue is to examine changes in the 
household composition for the elderly who do not move. 
To study whether our results hold true for the non-migratory elderly, we re-estimate 
selected models conditioning on those elderly who live in rural settings and who do not report 
moving within the past seven years.  This selection drops approximately one half of the 
observations used in the text.  Results from estimating our main models on this sample are in 
table 4. 
  When we consider the household composition results, we find that they are robust to 
conditioning on rural non-movers.  Again, total household size does not seem to change, nor 
does the propensity to live independently.  Pension eligibility is also associated with large 
increases in the number of children 0-5 and women 18-23, and decreases in the number of 
women 30-39.  Overall, the migration of the elderly does not appear to be the driving force 
behind our results.  Instead, the observed changes in household composition appear to reflect 




        
Variable  Women aged 50-59 Women aged 60-69 
# Individuals - unweighted  74,211  63,084 
Age 54.3  64.1 
 (2.8)  (2.8) 
Household size  5.74  5.90 
 (3.18)  (3.31) 
# kids 0-5 in HH  0.74  0.82 
 (1.02)  (1.08) 
# women 18-23 in HH  0.41  0.34 
 (0.65)  (0.61) 
# men 18-23 in HH  0.35  0.29 
 (0.61)  (0.57) 
# women 30-39 in HH  0.22  0.30 
 (0.49)  (0.56) 
# men 30-39 in HH  0.19  0.25 
 (0.46)  (0.52) 
Standard deviations in parentheses.  All means are weighted to be representative of the black 
headed population of households in South Africa.  All data are from the 1996 population 
census, black women living in black headed households. 
 
Table 2: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of Pensions on 
Independent Living 
  
Variable Effect [mean]      
Household size  0.085 [5.82]    
 (1.51)      
Lives Alone  -0.002 [0.05]    
 (0.44)      
Lives alone or with spouse only  0.005 [0.08]    
   (0.99)        
T-statistics in parentheses.  RD estimates of treatment effects estimate the jump in household size 
associated with turning 60 for women.  RD methodology based on Porter (2000), as discussed in 
text.  Conditional mean at treatment age of LHS variable in brackets.  Data are from the 1996 
census, black individuals living in black headed households.  Estimates are based on 10% census 
samples, with 53,834 observations having nonzero weight in estimation of treatment effect. 
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Table 3: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of Pensions on 
Household Composition 
  
Variable Effect [mean]      
# kids 0-5  0.051 [0.78]     
 (2.80)      
# women 18-23  0.041 [0.35]     
 (3.75)      
# women 30-39  -0.038 [0.31]     
 (4.03)      
Births in HH in past year  -0.006 [0.09]     
   (0.83)        
T-statistics in parentheses.  RD estimates of treatment effects estimate the jump in household size 
associated with turning 60 for women.  RD methodology based on Porter (2000), as discussed in 
text.  Conditional mean at treatment age of LHS variable in brackets.  Data are from the 1996 
census, black individuals living in black headed households.  Estimates are based 10% census 
samples, with 53,834 observations having nonzero weight in estimation of treatment effect. 
 
 
Table 4: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Non-migrant Women Pensioners 
Conditioning on not moving within 7 years and living in Rural area 
 
Variable Effect [mean]     
Household size  0.003  [6.09]   
 (0.05)     
Lives alone  -0.001  [0.04]   
 (0.13)     
Lives alone or with spouse  0.006  [0.06]   
 (1.09)     
# kids 0-5  0.069  [0.89]   
 (2.62)     
# women 18-23  0.034  [0.37]   
 (2.82)     
# women 30-39  -0.034  [0.26]   
   (2.90)       
T-statistics in parentheses.  RD estimates of treatment effects estimate the jump in household size associated with 
turning 60 for women.  RD methodology based on Porter (2000), as discussed in text.  Conditional mean at treatment 
age of LHS variable in brackets.  Data are from the 1996 census, black individuals living in black headed households.  
Estimates are based on 10% census samples, with 35,496 observations having nonzero weight in estimation of treatment 
effect. 








































50 55 60 65 70
Age of Woman
Estimate of Discontinuity (alpha) = -0.125, T-statistic = 15.27
 
Panel A 

























































50 55 60 65 70
Age of Woman
Estimate of Discontinuity (alpha) = 0.120, T-statistic = 14.50
 
Panel B 
Probability that income is at least 200 Rand per month 
 
Figure 1 































50 55 60 65 70
Age of Woman
Estimate of Discontinuity (alpha) = 0.085, T-statistic = 1.51
 
Figure 2 














































50 55 60 65 70
Age of Woman
Estimate of Discontinuity (alpha) = 0.005, T-statistic = 0.99
 
Figure 3 
The probability of living alone or only with spouse and Pension Eligibility, Census Means and 
Regression Discontinuity Results 








































50 55 60 65 70
Age of Woman
Estimate of Discontinuity (alpha) = 0.051, T-statistic = 2.80
 
Figure 4 
















































50 55 60 65 70
Age of Woman
Estimate of Discontinuity (alpha) = 0.041, T-statistic = 3.75
 
Figure 5 
The number of resident women 18-23 and pension eligibility, Census Means and Regression 








































50 55 60 65 70
Age of Woman
Estimate of Discontinuity (alpha) = -0.038, T-statistic = 4.03
 
Figure 6 






































































































* Significant at 95%.  95% confidence intervals are pictured
 
Figure 7 
Age-by-age changes in the number of resident females and males when a woman becomes 





















































































* Significant at 95%.  95% confidence intervals are pictured
 
Figure 8 
Age-by-age percentage changes in the number of resident females and males when a woman 
becomes pension eligible at age 60, regression discontinuity results 
 
  
 